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CONSUMER PROTECTION: SHOULD
IT MANDATE EXTENSION OF
SECTION 402A TO USED PRODUCTS
DEALERS?
Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co.1
When a consumer is injured by a product he has purchased new, strict
liability in tort provides an avenue for redress against the manufacturer, sup-
plier, and retailer of the product. When the consumer is injured by a second-
hand product purchased from a used goods dealer, however, he may have little
chance of holding the dealer responsible for his injuries. Courts are in conflict
over the! issue of whether strict liability in tort should be extended to dealers of
non-reconditioned, used goods. Relatively few jurisdictions have actually con-
sidered the question. Courts in Wisconsin,2 California, 3 and Oregon, 4 among
others,5 have refused to extend strict liability to used goods dealers. On the
other hand, courts in New Jersey6 and Texas7 take the opposite view. In reach-
ing their respective positions, courts on both sides of the issue relied on their
perceptions of the competing policy considerations.
In Jordan v. Sunnyslope Appliance Propane & Plumbing Supplies Co.,8
1. 135 Ariz. 309, 660 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
2. Burrows v. Follett & Leach, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 272, 340 N.W.2d 485
(1983).
3. LaRosa v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 741, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1981) (used machinery dealer); Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co. v. Superior
Court, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct; App. 1980) (auctioneer of
used goods).
4. Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979) (used
equipment dealer).
5, Masker v. Smith, 405 So. 2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court limited
its refusal to impose strict liability on the used goods seller to latent defects which the
dealer could not discover by the exercise of reasonable care); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt
Chevrolet Co., 61 111. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975) (used car dealer); Pridgett v.
Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1971) (seller of scrap iron sold 55-
gallon drum which exploded when the plaintiff attempted to cut the drum with an
acetylene torch); Brigham v. Hudson Motors, 118 N.H. 590, 392 A.2d 130 (1978)
(court stated in a two sentence paragraph that it was not prepared to extend strict
liability to a used automobile dealer).
6. Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62
(1975) (used truck dealer); Ortiz v. Farrell Co., 171 N.J. Super. 109, 407 A.2d 1290
(1979) (used machinery dealer).
7. Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (used brick
dealer).
8. 135 Ariz. 309, 660 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
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the court extended strict liability to dealers of used products following Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A.9 The father of plaintiff Jordan
purchased a used propane storage tank in December, 1975, from Canyon Gas
and Appliance Co. (Canyon Gas), a dealer of used propane tanks. The tank
was manufactured nearly thirty years earlier, in 1947, by American Pipe &
Steel Company. Jordan's father inspected and then purchased the tank with-
out any guarantees regarding its condition. The tank was placed on a lot adja-
cent to Jordan's home and used regularly for eighteen months without inci-
dent. Then, while the tank was being filled by Sunnyslope, the hose used to fill
the tank disconnected; the propane then exploded and totally destroyed Jor-
dan's house.Y0
Jordan sued Canyon Gas, the used tank dealer, and American Pipe alleg-
ing that the tank's shut-off valve malfunctioned, thus allowing propane in the
tank to escape. Jordan sued on the theory of strict liability in tort, alleging the
valve was defective in design, material, construction, or workmanship. The
trial court dismissed American Pipe because there was no evidence that the
valve was on the tank when it left the manufacturer. The trial court also
granted the used tank dealer's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Can-
yon Gas from the case."'
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the summary judg-
ment, holding that a dealer in used goods may be held strictly liable under
section 402A.12 The court reasoned that the "unreasonably dangerous" re-
quirement of section 402A sufficiently protected the used goods dealer.' 3 Im-
posing strict liability on used goods dealers was found consistent with the en-
terprise liability concept integral to Arizona's version of the strict liability
theory.' 4
Strict liability under section 402A was originally directed to manufactur-
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
10. Sunnyslope, 660 P.2d at 1237.
11. Id. at 1237.
12. Id. at 1242.
13. Id. at 1241.
14. Id. at 1242 (citing Tucson Indus. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol50/iss1/12
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ers, suppliers, and sellers of new products in the initial chain of distribution.15
Recently, courts extended strict liability to used product dealers who rebuilt or
reconditioned goods prior to sale.16 Courts have disagreed concerning whether
strict liability under section 402A should be extended further to include deal-
ers of used goods who have not rebuilt or reconditioned their products.1
7
Support for extending strict liability to used goods dealers is found in the
comments to section 402A. Comment f states that section 402A does not apply
to the occasional seller who is not operating as a business.18 "Nor does it apply
to the owner of an automobile who, on one occasion, sells it to his neighbor, or
even sells it to a dealer in used cars, and this even though he is fully aware
that the dealer plans to resell it.""' This implies that if the owner of the used
automobile sold it in the course of business, rather than in an isolated sale, the
seller may be liable for defect-related injuries under section 402A.
The basis for section 402A strict liability is the special responsibility for
the public's safety undertaken by one in the business of "supplying human
beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons and
property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those
who purchase such goods."'20 Section 402A applies to one in the business of
supplying the public with products. It is beyond dispute that a dealer in used
goods supplies the public with products. Neither section 402A nor its com-
ments expressly limits the rule to sellers of new products. 21 Rather, liability is
imposed on the seller of "any product. '22 In addition, comment f provides that
the rule "applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for
use or consumption."' 23 Section 402A literally applies, therefore, to used goods
dealers.
There are three general bases for imposing strict liability under section
402A upon manufacturers, distributors, and retailers of new products: manu-
facturing defects, 2' design defects, 25 and failure to warn. 26 With used prod-
15. See, e.g., Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969)
(wholesale distributor of sump pump could be held liable for wrongful death under
strict liability in tort theory).
16. See Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31 (S.D. 1983)
(seller of a reconditioned clothes dryer can be held strictly liable under section 402A
for damages caused by defective thermostat in dryer).
17. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
22. Id. at 306 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)).
The Sunnyslope court could not find any Arizona cases nor any language in section
402A which required the seller to be in the initial chain of distribution. Sunnyslope,
660 P.2d at 1242.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment f (1965) (emphasis
added),
24. A product has a manufacturing defect when it has either deviated in some
material way from the manufacturer's specifications or standards or differs from other-
[Vol. 50
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ucts, "subsequent defects" can arise after the product has left the manufac-
turer or original seller.27
Since the used goods dealer is not responsible for and generally unable to
remedy manufacturing or design defects, courts are justified in refusing to im-
pose strict liability for these defects.2" The enterprise liability theory would
impose strict liability on used goods dealers for design and manufacturing de-
fects. Requiring used goods dealers to insure against these defects, however,
could lead to overlapping insurance coverage and unnecessarily increase the
cost of consumer protection.2
The policy reasons for strict liability justify holding a dealer in used goods
responsible for injuries caused by subsequent defects. There are three major
policy justifications for imposing strict liability: enterprise liability,30 satisfac-
tion of reasonable consumer expectations, and risk reduction.31
Enterprise liability is the primary policy justification for imposing strict
liability on manufacturers and commercial dealers of goods.32 Under this the-
ory, the cost of injuries resulting from defective products is imposed on the
wise identical units of the same product line. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 16A(4)(f)(iii) (1981); see also Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in De-
sign Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 534 (1983) ("[a] manu-
facturing defect is readily identifiable because the product differs from the manufac-
turer's intended result.").
25. A design defect affects a whole line of products and is the result of the
manufacturer's decision to adopt a particular design. Note, Torts-Product Liabil-
ity-Strict Liability for Defect in Design, 43 Mo. L. REV. 601, 602 (1978).
26. See Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review
of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 586 (1980) (a product may be defective as
marketed because of the manufacturer's or seller's failure to warn purchasers and users
of some risk or hazard). See generally Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974); Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and
the Meaning of Defect, 10 CUM. L. REV. 293 (1979).
27. Burrows v. Follett & Leach, Inc., 340 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Wis. 1983).
28. See Comment, Used Products and Strict Liability: A Practical Approach
to a Complex Problem, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 154, 156-57. Often, courts do not analyze
the nature of the defect. See Sunnyslope, 660 P. 2d at 1236; Hovenden, 529 S.W.2d at
305. But see Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 292, 336 A.2d at 70 (court focused on the
nature of the defect, labelling defects in parts which ordinarily receive regular mainte-
nance and replacement as "safety defects").
29. See Comment, supra note 28, at 159-64 (absent special circumstances,
strict liability should not be imposed upon a commerical seller of used goods for design
and manufacturing defects).
30. See, e.g., Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69.
31. See, e.g., Tillman, 286 Or. at 752-54, 596 P.2d at 1302-03. See generally
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681
(1980); Comment, Used Products and Strict Liability: Where Public Safety and Ca-
veat Emptor Intersect, 19 CALIF. W.L. REV. 330 (1983); Note, Protecting the Buyer of
Used Products: Is Strict Liability for Commercial Sellers Desirable?, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 535 (1981).
32. Note, Sales of Defective Used Products: Should Strict Liability Apply?, 52
S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 811 (1979).
1985]
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business enterprise which profits from their sale. This theory assumes that the
business enterprise will include damages caused by its products in their cost.
33
The business enterprise can insure against the risk of injury caused by defec-
tive products and distribute the cost among consumers as a cost of doing busi-
ness. 34 Losses incurred by an individual are thus spread over a large group of
people, thereby lessening the impact on the individual. 35
Section 402A, comment c supports the enterprise liability rationale. 36
Comment c states that public policy requires commercial sellers to bear the
burden of accidental injuries caused by the products they sell. This burden can
be treated as a production cost and insured against.
3 7
Courts primarily have relied on the enterprise liability concept in ex-
tending strict liability to used goods dealers.38 In effect, these courts are
spreading the risk of injury and forcing used goods dealers to pay for injuries
caused by subsequent defects in their products.
In Sunnyslope, the court relied on the enterprise liability concept as the
main justification for imposing strict liability under section 402A.39 The court
noted that used goods dealers should be able to distribute costs and either shift
or insure against losses. 40 The court noted that small business' ability to obtain
33. See Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69; see also Escola v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring). For an in-depth article on the enterprise theory of liability, see
Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153 (1976).
34. See Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
35. See Note, supra note 32, at 543.
36. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNrD) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment c (1965).
37. Id.
38. See Hovenden, 529 S.W.2d at 310; Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 289, 336
A.2d at 69. In Hovenden, strict liability was imposed on a used brick dealer for dam-
ages resulting from plaintiff's use of defective bricks. The court noted that section
402A, comment c clearly adopted the enterprise liability theory. Hovenden, 529
S.W.2d at 310. The Hovenden court cited cases holding lessors of defective products
strictly liable as support for its holding because a leased chattel is generally a used
product. Id. at 307. Cases extending strict liability to lessors of defective products in-
clude: Cintrone v. Hertz Trucking, Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 75, 470 P.2d 240, 243
(1970); Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975). See generally Annot., 52
A.L.R.3d 121 (1973). In Turner, strict liability was extended to a used truck dealer;
the enterprise liability theory was mentioned as the primary justification for imposing
strict liability. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69.
39. Sunnyslope, 660 P.2d at 1242 (quoting Tucson Indus. v. Schwartz, 108
Ariz. 464, 467-68, 501 P.2d 936, 939-40 (1972), for the proposition that "[s]trict lia-
bility is a public policy device to spread the risk from one to whom a defective product
may be a castastrophe, to those who marketed the product, profit from its sale, and
have the know-how to remove its defects before placing it in the chain of distribu-
tion."). This rationale follows the justifications set forth in section 402A, comment c.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
40. Sunnyslope, 660 P.2d at 1242. For an analysis of the role of insurance and
risk distribution in products liability law, see Comment, Solving the Products Liability
Insurance Crisis: A Study of the Role of Economic Theory in the Legislative Reform
[Vol. 50
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product liability insurance was greatly enhanced by the Product Liability Risk
Retention Act of 1981."1 The Act permits manufacturers and sellers of prod-
ucts to establish "risk retention groups" to write product liability insurance.' 2
The leading case refusing to extend strict liability to a seller of used prod-
ucts is Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co.43 The Tillman court was unwilling to
rely exclusively on enterprise liability as justification for imposing strict liabil-
ity.44 The court noted that even though used goods dealers were capable of
both providing compensation to injured parties and allocating the cost of inju-
ries caused by their products, it was not convinced that the overall policy con-
siderations justified the imposition of strict liability.45
The approach taken by the court in Sunnyslope is preferable from a pol-
icy standpoint to that taken by the court In Tillman. The used goods dealer's
cost of doing business should include the cost of damages caused by subse-
quent defects in the products he sells. As between the purchaser and seller of
used goods, the burden of accidental injuries should be placed on the seller
who marketed the product with a subsequent defect. 41 By marketing a product
with a subsequent defect, the used products dealer causes the purchaser to
incur a risk of injury. Liability for the purchaser's injuries should be imposed
on the seller who created "the risk and reaped the profit by placing the prod-
uct in the stream of commerce. '47 If the used goods dealer includes the risk of
damages in the cost of his products, any actual loss by an individual purchaser
is spread to many persons thereby relieving "uninsured accident victims of a
sudden, crushing economic blow that may tear apart the fabric of the victim's
life."48
Process, 31 MERCER L. REv. 755 (1980).
41. Sunnyslope, 660 P.2d at 1242 n.4 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901-04 (1982)).
42. The "risk retention" group is an insurance company primarily organized to
assume and spread the product liability risk exposure of its group members. See King,
Product Liability Risk Retention-The Act and Its Implications, 39 J. Mo. BAR 265
(1983); Maxfield, Risk Retention Act: An Alternative Form of Product Liability In-
surance for Small Business, 32 FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. 263 (1982); Murphy, Product
Liability Self Insurance, 38 J. Mo. BAR 55 (1982); Shea, The Product Liability Risk
Retention Act of 1981, 28 PRAC. LAW. 9, 11 (1982).
43. 286 Or. 747, 596 P.2d 1299 (1979). Tillman involved injuries from a defec-
tive used crane sold to plaintiff's employer by the defendant. Id. at 749, 596 P.2d at
1300.
44. Id. at 753-54, 596 P.2d at 1302-03.
45. Id. at 757, 596 P.2d at 1303.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965).
47. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186
(1965).
48. Owen, supra note 31, at 706. Similar language is found in Justice Traynor's
concurring opinion in Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J.,
concurring):
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
1985]
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The safety of the general public demands that when a used car, for exam-
ple, is sold for use as a serviceable vehicle, the dealer be responsible for safety
defects present when the vehicle is sold. Otherwise, the purchaser and general
public would be bearing the liability rather than the used car dealer. 49 With
respect to subsequent defects, the used goods dealer is the only commercial
seller that can distribute the cost of the risk of the defective products he is
selling. A purchaser who has sustained damages from a subsequent defect has
no recourse against the manufacturer or original retailer of the product.50
Even though it refused to hold a used goods dealer responsible for a design
defect injury, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that "if a jurisdiction has
adopted the principle of strict liability on the basis of enterprise liability, the
liability of the seller of either a new or used product would logically follow."51
Since dealers in used goods can insure against injuries arising from products
having subsequent defects,52 they are in a better position to spread the risk of
injuries to all customers.
The satisfaction of reasonable consumer expectations, or implied repre-
sentations, has been identified as another policy justification for imposing strict
liability for injuries caused by defective products. The implied representations
theory assumes that, by placing a product on the market, a manufacturer or
commercial seller impliedly represents that the product is not unreasonably
dangerous for its intended use.53 If the product falls below the degree of safety
that reasonable consumers expect, strict liability is justifiably imposed on the
manufacturer,54 or commercial seller.
The Tillman court identified the implied representations theory as an ad-
ditional justification for strict liability. When used goods are involved, how-
ever, the court reasoned that the dealer makes no particular representations
about the quality of his goods merely by offering them for sale. If a buyer
wants assurances of quality, he can bargain for it or purchase from a dealer
who offers quality.55 In contrast, other courts have noted that reading section
402A to limit liability to representational conduct is inconsistent with lan-
public as a cost of doing business.
49. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1)(b) (1965) requires an injury
causing product to be in substantially the same condition as when it was sold to impose
liability on the manufacturer or original commercial seller of the product.
51. Tillman, 286 Or. at 753, 596 P.2d at 1302.
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
53. See Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 267, 509 P.2d 529, 532
(1973); see also Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring)
(consumers accept products on faith, relying on the manufacturer's reputation or on
the product's trademark).
54. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) ("[i]mplicit in the machine's presence on the
market was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built").
55. Tillman, 286 Or. at 753-54, 596 P.2d at 1303. Examples given by the court
include purchases from a dealer who provides a guarantee, limits his goods to those of a
certain quality, or advertises that his goods are specially selected.
[Vol. 50
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guage in comments c and m of that section.58
The court in Sunnyslope disagreed with the Tillman court's conclusion
that sales of used products do not normally generate expectations of safety.5 7
The Sunnyslope court could find no empirical evidence indicating that con-
sumers of used products expected such products to contain unsafe defects.
Moreover, the Tillman court's conclusion ignores the interests of bystanders
who may be injured by a defective product purchased by another. 58 Even
though they do not rely on the dealer's implied representations of safety, the
majority of courts now allow bystanders injured by defective products to re-
cover under strict liability.59 Furthermore, the Tillman court's contention that
sales of used products do not imply any representation of safety or quality
contradicts the well-reasoned decisions extending the implied warranty of
merchantability to used goods."'
Generally, a merchantable good must be fit for the ordinary purposes for
which it is used6" and be safe for its intended use.62 Since many courts imply a
56. Hovenden, 529 S.W.2d at 309. Section 402A, comment c justifies strict lia-
bility on the enterprise liability theory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment c (1965). Comment m notes that a number of courts have used a warranty
theory as a basis for strict liability under section 402A. Id. comment m. Since a war-
ranty has become so identified with a contract of sale, the warranty becomes an obsta-
cle to imposing strict liability when there is no contract. Courts using a warranty the-
ory as a basis for strict liability should recognize that the warranty is different than
that usually found in the sale of goods and is not subject to contract rules normally
associated with such sales. Comment m further notes:
[Section 402A] does not require any reliance on the part of the consumer
upon the reputation, skill, or judgment of the seller who is to be held liable,
nor any representations or undertaking on the part of that seller . . . . In
short, 'warranty' must be given a new, different meaning if it is used in con-
nection with this Section. It is much simpler to regard the liability here stated
as merely one of strict liability in tort.
57. Sunnyslope, 660 P.2d at 1240 (citing Tillman, 286 Or. at 755, 596 P.2d at
1303).
58. 660 P.2d at 1240.
59. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 704
(5th ed. 1984).
60. See, e.g., Moore v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc., 39 Colo. App. 11, 563 P.2d 369
(1977); Worthey v. Specialty Foam Prods., Inc., 591 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Mo. App., St.
L.D. 1979) (sale of used goods carries an implied warranty of merchantability); see
also Note, Sales: Extension of Implied Warranty of Merchantability to Used Goods,
46 Mo. L. REv. 249 (1981).
61. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c).
62. See Mosier v. American Motors Corp., 303 F. Supp. 44, 50 (S.D. Tex.
1967) (under Ohio law, manufacturer/seller of product impliedly warrants that the
product sold is of good and merchantable quality, fit and safe for its intended use),
aff'd, 414 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1969); Nash v. General Elec. Co., 64 Ohio App. 2d 25, 27,
410 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1979) (manufacturer of product impliedly warrants that the
product sold is of merchantable quality, fit and safe for its ordinary intended use);
Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, _, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)
(gas stove sold by defendant was under implied warranty of merchantability that stove
was reasonably safe for its intended use).
1985]
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warranty of merchantability in the sale of used goods, there must be some
expectation of safety generated when a used goods dealer sells a product.
Moreover, Oregon's implied representation justification for strict liability has
its basis in the implied warranty of merchantable quality in the law of sales.63
Reliance on the implied representations theory as a justification for strict
liability is suspect, especially when one considers that it is based on a "war-
ranty." Section 402A, comment m noted that some courts have resorted to a
warranty theory as a theoretical basis for strict liability.6' In some instances,
however, use of the warranty theory has proved to be unfortunate. If the war-
ranty theory is based on tort concepts, it is not subject to contract rules.
Rather than give a new meaning to "warranty," it is simpler to regard section
402A liability as strict liability in tort, since section 402A "does not require
. . . any representation or undertaking on the part of" the seller who is to be
held strictly liable.63 Thus, the implied representations theory espoused by the
Tillman court seems inconsistent with section 402A, comment m. Liability
under section 402A does not require any representation by the seller. Presum-
ably, this means no implied representations as to safety or quality are required
to impose strict liability on the seller. The purchaser should not have to bar-
gain for some assurance of quality since liability arises without representations
or undertakings by the seller. Accordingly, use of the implied representations
theory as a rationale for refusing to extend strict liability to used products
dealers should be abandoned.
The risk reduction justification for strict liability assumes that manufac-
turers and commercial sellers of goods are less apt to place unreasonably dan-
gerous goods in the market if they are held financially responsible for defect-
related injuries. 66 Comments to section 402A do not directly address this justi-
fication. However, the Tillman court relied on this theory to refuse extension
of strict liability to used goods dealers. Since the used products dealer gener-
ally has no direct relationship with the manufacturer, the court reasoned that
no significant risk reduction could be achieved by imposing strict liability upon
such dealers. 67 Further, the court noted that the dealer might have difficulty in
63. Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 265 Or. 259, 266, 509 P.2d 529, 532 (1973);
see also Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Or. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971) (O'Connell,
J., concurring). In Cornelius, Justice O'Connell stated that:
[t]he idea running through the implied warranty cases is that a seller who
purports to sell an article of a certain character impliedly represents that the
product meets the standard which an article of that type normally has in the
market. We may assume that the legislature, in adopting the commercial
code, intended to limit the seller's liability within this framework of represen-
tational conduct, however implied. If so, § 402A must be similarly
circumscribed.
Id. at 579-80, 484 P.2d at 306-07.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment m (1965).
65. Id.
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obtaining indemnity from the manufacturer, which would have provided an
incentive for the manufacturer to produce safer products.68
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Burrows v. Follett & Leach, Inc.,9
adopted the Tillman court's rationale to justify a refusal to extend section
402A to the seller of a used corn picker. The plaintiff had been seriously in-
jured when he became entangled in the power take-off shaft of the used
cornpicker. In refusing to impose strict liability upon the seller, the court
placed particular significance on the risk reduction policy and the fact that the
defect arose after the product left the manufacturer or original seller. The
court noted that "the risk prevention policy identified in Tillman loses all force
in the case of defects that arise after the product leaves the original manufac-
turing and distribution chain."7 0 Furthermore, the court reasoned that when
the manufacturer is not responsible for the defect that caused the injury, there
is no incentive to improve the safety of the goods.7 1 However, such reasoning
fails to take into account the ability of the seller to inspect and repair defective
used products before they are sold.
In Burrows, the dealer who sold the used corn picker could have averted
the accident by eliminating the defect,72 or not selling the cornpicker (recoup-
ing his investment by selling the corn picker for parts). Alternatively, the
dealer did not have to accept on trade the corn picker with a subsequent de-
fect. Therefore, imposing strict liability on the dealer of used goods provides
an incentive for the dealer to inspect, remedy, or warn the consumer about
subsequent defects before placing the good into the stream of commerce,
thereby reducing the risk of injury from the used product.
The Sunnyslope court noted that "imposing strict liability on the com-
mercial dealer of used products should result in increased maintenance and
inspection of such products before they are offered for sale."17 3 For example, a
dealer of used cars or machinery has an extended opportunity to inspect the
68. Id. The court noted that the ability of the used products dealer to obtain
indemnity from the product's manufacturer was affected by the statute of limitations
and difficulties in locating a solvent manufacturer.
69. 340 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1983).
70. Id. at 491.
71. Id.
72. In Burrows, the used corn picker was defective in that the guard that
shielded the power take-off shaft was missing. Id. at 487. The dealer could have pur-
chased the missing guard or had its shop personnel fashion a replacement. The corn
picker was a 1949 model and was sold to the plaintiff's father in 1974, approximately
one year after replacement shields ceased to be available from the manufacturer. Id. at
487-88. Nevertheless, the dealer probably could have obtained a shield from an area
dealer for that manufacturer or from a scrapped corn picker. Apparently, the dealer
made no effort to replace the missing shield. Id. at 488. Evidence was controverted
concerning whether the missing shield was discussed at the time of sale, much less
whether an adequate warning of the danger was given. Id. The dealer could have re-
duced the risk of harm by either replacing the shield or not selling the dangerous corn
picker.
73. Sunnyslope, 660 P.2d at 1240.
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good and normally has the facilities and expertise to detect subsequent defects.
The dealer is, at least, in a far better position to inspect and remedy defects
than the consumer. In a case involving a lessor of automobiles, the New Jersey
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he operator of [a] rental business must be re-
garded as possessing expertise with respect to the service life and fitness of his
vehicles for use. That expertise ought to put him in a better position than the
bailee to detect or to anticipate flaws or defects or fatigue in his vehicles. 174
Similarly, the used goods dealer should be regarded as possessing expertise
with respect to the safety of his products. That expertise puts him in a better
position than the consumer to detect or anticipate flaws or defects in his prod-
ucts, particularly the risk of injuries from subsequent defects. Since the used
goods dealer is generally familiar with his products, he should know which
parts are likely to become defective and how these defects can be remedied
before sale. In the case of a used car dealer, the dealer has the best opportu-
nity to determine the condition of the car. By placing a value on the car, the
dealer must determine the car's condition, particularly whether it is reasonably
safe for the buyer to operate. 5
Imposing strict liability on used goods dealers provides an incentive for
dealers to have the facilities necessary to inspect a good before placing it for
sale. Subsequent safety defects arise in ordinary parts expected to receive reg-
ular maintenance and replacement (such as an automobile's brake shoes and
linings, steering linkage, and exhaust system). 76 Inspection and replacement of
worn-out items reduces the safety risk associated with used cars. Since the car
is used, expectations of quality and durability will be lower, commensurate
with the price, age, and appearance of the vehicle.77 The dealer, nevertheless,
could be expected to remedy subsequent defects, making the car reasonably
safe for use. Safety of the general public demands that the dealer be responsi-
ble for safety defects existing at the time of sale when a vehicle is sold for use
as a serviceable vehicle (not for scrap) .78 Similarly, dealers of other used goods
can inspect for and remedy safety or subsequent defects. Accordingly, the risk
reduction policy justification for strict liability is furthered by extending strict
liability to used goods dealers for injuries caused by subsequent defects in
their products.79
74. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 457, 212
A.2d 769, 778 (1965) (court imposed strict liability on lessors). For cases extending
strict liability to lessors of defective chattels, see supra note 38.
75. Armour v. Haskins, 275 S.W.2d 580, 584 (Ky. 1955).
76. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 289, 336 A.2d at 69.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 24, § 19.03 (5),
where the authors state that "[i]t is conceded that a buyer of a used car, for example,
cannot expect it to last as long as a new one. But, it can be argued that he is entitled to
expect that there is no latent defect in the brakes or other parts of the car."
79. Therefore, the Tillman and Burrows courts' reliance on the risk reduction
theory as a justification for refusing to extend strict liability to used goods dealers is
misplaced in the case of subsequent defects. The Tillman case, however, involved a
[Vol. 50
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A court declined to extend strict liability to a used goods dealer for a
defect that arose after the product had left the manufacturer because the used
goods dealer did not create the risk.a0 However, this rationale fails to take into
account that, as between the consumer and the dealer, the dealer is obviously
in the better position to reduce the risk. Also, the dealer placed the used prod-
uct into the stream of commerce and, like the manufacturer, reaped a profit
therefrom.8'
In one case, a court placed particular emphasis on the "unreasonably dan-
gerous" standard of section 402A in extending strict liability to a used goods
dealer.8 Under section 402A, liability can be imposed only if the product's
defective condition was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.8 3 An
unreasonably dangerous product "must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics." '84 However, the "unreasonably dangerous" test can be modified to enable
a court to look at the "sophistication of the injured purchaser and the reasona-
ble expectations of the seller to determine whether the strict liability rule
should be applied.
8 5
design defect. There, the risk reduction theory might not be served by imposing strict
liability on the used goods dealer for the manufacturer's design defect. As for subse-
quent defects, however, the dealer normally can remedy them before offering the goods
for sale. In any event, as evidenced by the comments to section 402A, risk reduction is
not listed as a justification for the rule.
80. See Burrows, 340 N.W.2d at 491.
81. Metzger, Products Liability and the Seller of Used Goods, 15 Am. Bus. L.J.
159, 164 (1977).
82. See Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 291, 336 A.2d at 71. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A imposes liability on a commercial seller "who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user" (emphasis
added).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965).
84. Id. In effect, the jury applies a consumer expectations test to determine if a
used product is unreasonably dangerous. See Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 170 Conn.
18, 23, 364 A.2d 175, 178 (1975) (held proper for jury to determine that a two-year-
old used car driven only 46,000 miles and containing structural defects affecting the
suspension of the left front wheel, was "unreasonably dangerous"). In Slepski, the
court noted that "the jury can draw its own reasonable conclusions as to the expecta-
tions of the ordinary consumer and the knowledge in the community at large." Id.
85. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 293, 336 A.2d at 71. Although prior New Jersey
decisions questioned the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification, see Glass v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 601, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973) (unreasonably dangerous
requirement held inapplicable to common law concept of strict liability in tort), the
Turner court stated that the qualification was necessary to impose strict liability on
used products dealers. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 291, 336 A.2d at 70 (citing Cronin v.
J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972)). The
Turner court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to consider whether
the unreasonably dangerous requirement would be applicable in contexts other than
hepatitis-infected blood. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 290-91, 336 A.2d at 70 (citing
Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 66 N.J. 448, 451, 332 A.2d 596, 597 (1975)). The New
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The unreasonably dangerous standard serves as a liability-limiting fac-
tor.8 6 The term "unreasonable" enables the court or jury to inquire into the
product's nature, age, and condition, thus providing a standard against which
to measure any defect.8 7 The unreasonably dangerous standard also allows a
court to consider the sophistication of the injured purchaser, as well as the
seller's reasonable expectations, to determine whether strict liability applies.88
The relationship of the parties and the purchaser's sophistication might indi-
cate the product was not unreasonably dangerous to this particular pur-
chaser.8 9 The used goods dealer may avoid liability if the product was in such
poor condition that an ordinary consumer would be expected to find the de-
fects that caused the plaintiff's injuries." Moreover, the dealer might also
avoid liability if he gives a definite and specific warning of the particular de-
fect to the buyer and an ordinary consumer would not expect the used good to
operate safely until the defect was remedied.9 1 Accordingly, "[w]ith this 'un-
reasonably dangerous' element intact, the Restatement rule is as applicable to
the sale of a used product as to the sale of a new product."92
In Sunnyslope, the court placed particular reliance on the unreasonably
dangerous requirement of section 402A. Relying on the findings of the Turner
court, the court noted that the unreasonably dangerous requirement suffi-
ciently protected the used goods dealer since that standard allows inquiry into
the age and condition of the product and sophistication of the buyer.8 3
Jersey Supreme Court has since rejected the unreasonably dangerous standard in de-
sign defect cases. See Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. at 175, 406
A.2d at 152-53.
86. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 337, 340 (1973) (potential liability of
used goods dealer would not approach that of an insurer if liability was limited to used
products sold in a defective condition which were unreasonably dangerous considering
the age and condition of the product).
87. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 292, 336 A.2d at 70.
88. Id. at 293, 336 A.2d at 71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment g (1965) ("The rule stated in this section applies only where the product is,
at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him."). Note that comment g re-
fers to the ultimate consumer, not the ordinary consumer.
89. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 293, 336 A.2d at 71. An example cited by the
court would be when a hot rod enthusiast purchases a car containing various defects
and the relationship between the seller and purchaser is such that both reasonably ex-
pect the purchaser to inspect the car and correct defects. Id. (citing Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963)
(manufacturer "is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, know-
ing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being")).
90. Comment, Suit Against Used Car Dealer Based Upon Strict Liability in
Tort Dismissed For Failure to State a Cause of Action, 7 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 159, 180
(1976).
91. Id.
92. Turner, 133 N.J. Super. at 294, 336 A.2d at 71.
93. Sunnyslope, 660 P.2d at 1241. Thus, the unreasonably dangerous require-
ment takes into account factors such as mileage and age of a used car. Therefore, a
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The unreasonably dangerous requirement of section 402A has been re-
jected by California courts in cases involving used goods dealers.9' These
courts have adopted the Tillman rationale as consistent with the policy under-
lying California's strict liability doctrine.95 Consequently, California used
goods dealers do not have the liability-limiting protection of the unreasonably
dangerous standard.
Some courts and commentators argue that imposition of strict liability on
used goods dealers dramatically increases the price of used goods.96 However,
limiting the dealer's liability for injuries caused by subsequent defects should
result in safer used products without significantly altering the used goods mar-
ket. The resulting increase in product safety justifies any price increase. If
goods sold by non-commercial sellers become more attractive as lower-priced
substitutes, then consumers assume the risk that the product will not be as
safe as one purchased from the commercial dealer.
Enterprise liability, the primary policy justification for strict liability
under section 402A,97 is as applicable to dealers of used products with subse-
quent defects as it is to manufacturers and retailers of new products. Ex-
tending section 402A to such dealers would reduce the risk associated with
used products. The unreasonably dangerous requirement of section 402A
serves as a liability-limiting factor since it permits consideration of the condi-
tion of the product and circumstances surrounding the sale. Although the Sun-
nyslope holding was not so limited, courts should extend strict liability under
section 402A to cover injuries caused by used products with subsequent de-
fects sold by commercial dealers.
PAUL W. HAHN
dealer would not be expected to have new parts on a ten-year-old car with 80,000
miles. Nor would the dealer be expected to have new brake shoes on the car. However,
the vital safety parts such as steering linkage and brake system would be expected to
be in such condition that the car would be reasonably safe to drive. Reasonably safe
used parts could be substituted by the dealer for worn-out parts. Although the ordinary
consumer would not expect the used car's vital safety parts to last as long as a new
car's, he would expect the car's brakes, lights, and steering linkage to work in a reason-
ably safe manner.
94. Tauber-Arons, 101 Cal. App. 3d at 279 n.1, 161 Cal. Rptr. 795 n.1; Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 135, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433,
435 (1972).
95. E.g., LaRosa v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 741, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Tauber-Arons, 101 Cal. App. 3d 268, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980).
96. See Note, Protecting the Buyer of Used Products: Is Strict Liability for
Commercial Sellers Desirable?, 33 STAN. L. REv. 535, 538 (1981).
97. See supra note 32.
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